Pleiades Rising

Just had some Chinese food a couple of days ago, and I saved the fortune (I was thinking of this thread). It reads: "The troubles you have now will pass away quickly." It didn't say, however, if they'd [i]stay away.[/i] Oh yeah, my lucky numbers on that day were 29, 37, 38, 39, 16, 35.

I never get flu shots anymore. I don't want no government techno-nano bugs swimming in my blood. But seriously, I get the usual cough and sneeze in winter, but rarely anything serious anymore. Of course, I've had some bad colds that made me wish someone would have smothered me with a pillow, but I've lived through them - barely. Who knows, maybe my future involves my being hidden away in some remote forest shack or mountain cave, while I contemplate the virtues of having a mighty beard.

Dead or not, the argument lives on here and there. It's not hard to find this "argument" in many threads and blogs. So much so that I decided to leave my 3 dollars and 16 cents worth here. Why? This argument gets abused by so many people, atheists and theists. Frankly, I'm quite surprised that neither side of the disputants have actually figured out that paradox isn't doing what it's taken to do. If they have figured it out, smelled something fishy going on, I still wonder why the paradox (read: dilemma) continues to be debated as if it's a religious problem. I think the answer I gave is indeed the correct one, and I maintain that it undermines any naive understanding of the paradoxical arguments set forth. Until the argument is seen aright, I suspect that it will continue to lead anyone who thinks it a proper argument astray, into confusion and error that could be avoided.

[size="2"]Ah, yes, the paradox of the stone. This is quite the head-spinner, and has captured the attention of many minds to solve it. However, I state that I will make no attempt to solve or answer the paradox itself for reasons forthcoming, all of which I hope to be satisfactory. As such, I'll concentrate mainly on Argument 1, "God's Omnipotence." I deny that the paradox does what it's assumed to do, thus fails as a proof. It follows that the compound argument itself cannot do what it's supposed to do. It's improperly set-up. If I understand the question correctly, it asks if an omnipotent being is possible, given some definition of "omnipotence" (in this case, taken to mean something like: "can do anything; is almighty; has unlimited power"). And, given this definition, it then presents the paradox as proof that such an omnipotent being cannot exist. (Notice that the paradox is more of a [i]dilemma[/i], but I'll continue to use the term paradox.) If one continues to accept an omnipotent being, then Argument 1 moves on to Argument 2: either God is omnipotent (perhaps, in a now qualified sense), or God cannot be (entirely?) good. It's clear from quotes, such as "If he could [create a task he cannot do] then it proves that he is not omnipotent, if he cannot then that too proves he is not omnipotent" and "both possible solutions to the answer suggest a God that is not omnipotent" and "they are questions i've always had and have always attributed to my disbelief in God", that the paradox is taken to prove the impossibility of an unqualified omnipotent being existing. The last quote also suggests that Arguments 1 and 2 together provide reasons for believing that God does not exist (or, is unknowable if we agree with the opening sentence about agnosticism). In short, 1 and 2 are presented in the context of a religious argument, for which the paradox is taken to do its work. Now, the paradox is the hinge on which the entire argument turns; without which, 1 is undermined and 2 does not necessarily follow. I propose that the paradox in question is misunderstood and therefore cannot fully do the work it's supposed to do in the compound argument consisting of 1 and 2. In the argument presented so far, the paradox is seen as some sort of metaphysical tool of refutation, which somehow connects the logical form of the paradox to metaphysics through unquestioned means. It's assumed that the Paradox of the Stone (or, Omnipotence Paradox), as it's commonly presented, has the means to disprove that something is the case in the world - [i]it can prove a fact about the real world[/i]. Basically, it's often casually thrown into arguments as providing proof of the impossibility of an omnipotent being existing in the universe as we know it. However, this asks too much of the paradox on its own, for the paradox raises certain technical issues such as whether the given concept or argument in which it occurs is incoherent, confused, or inconsistent when presented in certain ways or formulations. It raises issues about our reasoning and its correctness; It gives us insight into our ability to reason logically and soundly. Notice that this can rightfully be studied as a[i] conceptual[/i] investigation, and not entirely as religious investigation. On this approach, I reject the implicit claim that I or anyone else must accept this argument [i]strictly as a religious argument[/i] in order to reply to it. The arguments presuppose that if I attempt to resolve or question the paradox, I'm committing myself to the belief that the paradox is purely a religious problem, and It assumes that I'm committed to the existence of an omnipotent being if I consider the questions posed. Argument 1, in which the paradox is supposed to do all the work, is understood as being a religious problem requiring religious answers. I contend that, as it stands, this is wrong. The paradox can be examined by logical means, both formal and semi-formal. In order to analyze the paradox, I can appeal to methods requiring no religious commitments at all, and still give a reasonable and cogent reply. First, a note on paradoxes of the sort appealed to in Argument 1. Certain paradoxes are unusual beasts. Notice that they can take the form of a logical argument: they can have premises which can be reasoned with, and they can have conclusions which seemingly follow from the premises. However, what distinguishes these kinds of paradoxes from common arguments is that their conclusions arrive at counterintuitive results. Somewhere along the lines of reasoning, something seems to go wrong with the arguments. Perhaps a premise is false, or the argument's structure is flawed in certain ways, leading to these strange conclusions. Upon closer inspection, paradoxical arguments may reveal that we really don't know the workings of certain concepts, e.g. "infinity", as certain paradoxes of Zeno's point out. The Ship of Thesus points to problems concerning our conception of identity, and perhaps also to our use of referential language. In Set Theory, Russell's Paradox presents problems when one attempts to use a concept in an unqualified way. When paradoxes present themselves, we can be fairly sure that we're in paradox city where the grass is green if and only if the grass isn't green. However, notice that what a paradoxical argument describes need not exist: there's no need to stage a race between a tortoise and a swift runner; there's no need to construct two ships, then ask which one is which; and there's no need to have anything physical beyond pen-and-paper to examine set-theoretical paradoxes. To study some paradoxes, all we need are writing materials and rigorous thought. Simply, it can be an entirely armchair analysis, studied [i]a priori[/i]. Indeed, the tools for studying paradoxes can be conceptual, and logical. It's not unusual to see paradoxes resolved by rigorous analyses involving various formal logics. (When building a brand new ship, the Predicate Calculus isn't nearly as helpful as a hammer.) Because paradoxical arguments share so much in common with logical arguments, formal and semi-formal means can be brought to bear upon their resolution. The Paradox of the Stone is no exception. It's been studied by thinkers such as Alvin Plantinga and George Mavrodes. Together, Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa published their paper "Anything You Can Do God Can Do Better" on the paradox. Plantinga's and Mavrodes' respective studies conclude that the paradoxical argument is inconsistent, while Brown and Nagasawa hold that the paradox begs the question and equivocates on key terms. These are studies which seem more like conceptual analyses involving formal proofs, instead of religious debates. They each accept definitions on God's omnipotence and certain doctrines (e.g. omnipotence being consistent with the inability to perform[i] impossible tasks[/i], which is what Kisaoda's reply, #25, hints at), and then transform them into symbolic representations which are then manipulated according to formal inference rules (which is what Raiha's reply, #21, also suggests). Key terms are also analysed to see if they retain the same meanings throughout the argument. In such analyses, it's typical to see a symbolic representation like "gAg [/size]�[size="2"] ~(gAg)" occurring within it. The paradox's form is often represented in symbolic forms like this, which is then treated in a proof - a proof of a different sort than how the word is used in this thread's topic. Basically, the paradox is treated logically, and it's not taken to prove anything substantial on its own. Much more needs to be done if anyone's to support a contentious metaphysical claim about God's attributes or existence. Plantinga, a theist, does not rest content with analysing the paradox, and does much work to motivate his theistic arguments. The paradox is merely a first step, which bears more resemblance to a conceptual problem than to a theological problem. To get from the paradox to God requires something else, and neither 1 nor 2 provide that something else. As I pointed out, we can study the paradox alone on formal terms, without supposing that we're engaging in a religious debate. If it's a religious debate, more is needed to motivate the argument than simply appealing to the paradox. The "proof" of the paradox is of a different sort, which doesn't work as the atheist or agnostic, or theist for that matter, thinks it does. The use of the word "proof" in this argument (viz. "Omnipotence and Omnipotent Beings") seems to refer to a type of method used in scientific contexts. The paradox is thought of as being this kind of empirical proof, showing the some being lacks an attribute. (Perhaps, in a similar way that a pig lacks the ability to fly.) These quotes supports this claim: "If he could [create a stone heavier than he can lift] then it proves that he is not omnipotent, if he cannot then that too proves he is not omnipotent. That's the point of the question" and "If he is omnipotent, then surely he can stop all human suffering. If you liked the first answer i gave to the first question, then why does God not want to help us and end our suffering?" The latter quote questions God's intervention in the known world. As such, the kind of proof appealed to here requires things outside itself to verify its claims. For example, to prove that [i]X[/i] has a half-life of [i]t[/i], you take measurements based on empirical means, including observations of equipment. Along these lines, we form a hypothesis and test the claims deduced from it against the relevant evidence, in accordance to an appropriate theory. In these cases, "proof" requires an appeal to experience - the map requires a corresponding territory, as it were. However, the paradox isn't this sort of proof at all. It fails on this account. To make it work as a scientific proof, it seems that we would need a deity and a rock, and scientists to make observations and measurements. But this seems beyond our range of proof. The "proof" in the argument set forth is actually closer to a mathematical or logical demonstration. The paradox questions [i]logical[/i] possibility, and not necessarily [i]physical[/i] possibility. What's the answer to "[i]x[/i] +[i] y[/i] = 5"? Is "(P & Q) & ~ (P & Q)" consistent? Do some set of numbers have a certain property? Let's construct a proof and find out. This proof involves formal rules and axioms couched in some formal theory, which produce theorems. It's sufficient that we can do this proof on paper alone, without having to count or examine sets of apples. The paradox, if it's a proof at all, is better understood as a being closer to a formal proof, a mathematical demonstration. It makes more sense if understood this way, especially in light on my earlier comments on various logical paradoxes and their resolutions. It now appears questionable that an attribute of God - which is seemingly taken to exist alongside things like electrical charges and mass - could be[i] tested and proved[/i] by a logical paradox. We should also notice that the argument doesn't really ask: resolve the paradox. Instead, it seems to assert: The paradox proves an omnipotent being does not exist. These quotes support the latter reading. "...both possible solutions to the answer suggest a God that is not omnipotent." "I ask these questions because they are questions i've always had and have always attributed to my disbelief in God." "Until i hear a better explanation, one that actually makes sense, i'm going to say that God can only either be good or omnipotent. God must pick one." "I seriously doubt that there is an answer to this question that actually satisfies the question and leaves God as an omnipotent being in the literal sense. But you're all welcome to keep trying." It's clear that the paradox is not only being used as some sort of empirical, scientific proof, but also as a tool of [i]refutation[/i]. As a tool of refutation, it's dropped into the argument as an insurmountable obstacle. It assumes that if anyone accepts that this is a religious argument and that an omnipotent being exists, then those claims lead to self-refuting conclusions. From which, we ought to give up our beliefs in such a being. This double-maneuver obscures the fact that the argument is attempting to be a scientific[i] inquiry[/i] (asking for further data and facts, to arrive at a conclusion) couched in terms of a [i]persuasion dialogue [/i](advancing a specific claim as already proved true, which we ought to accept). So, here we have an assertion put forward requiring more information to verify it (the inquiry part, using the first empirical sense of "proof"), and yet it's also put forward as being true and proved (the persuasion part, still relying on a misunderstood sense of "proof"). The thread is supposedly put forward as opening and allowing further inquiry and knowledge, but it can't because it's already proved something - but we're all welcome to keep trying! I'll leave it up to anyone who agrees with The13thMan's argument to sort out that jumble. Returning to the paradox - the heart of Argument 1 - the paradoxical argument becomes even more strange when we consider its form and claim. The paradox has the general form as follows: If God is omnipotent, can God create a task he cannot do? 1. Either God can create a task he cannot do, or God cannot create a task he cannot do. 2. If God can create a task he cannot do, then God is not omnipotent. 3. If God cannot create a task he cannot do, then God is not omnipotent. 4. Therefore, God is not omnipotent. Notice that the creation of the stone heavier than its creator can lift is simply an instance of such a task. It's not necessary that it be a stone, for it only has to be a task that its creator cannot do. Here's such an instance: Can God bake a cake that He cannot eat? It seems odd that omnipotence would hinge on such task as baking a cake. The stone seems grand and worthy of questioning omnipotence, and the cake doesn't. However, since they're both omnipotence-undermining tasks, I see no good reason for disallowing my modified task. To point out another odd thing, I can even replace "God" by "Ziggy" and the argument still works. I have just proved that Ziggy isn't omnipotent! But, one can counter, the question is about an omnipotent being, not Ziggy! Very well, then. Here's my own omnipotent being, created on the spot for this argument: Giggy is an omnipotent being. Now we have the following: If Giggy is omnipotent, can Giggy bake a cake he cannot eat? We now have a valid instance for both the original stone-task and my modified cake-task. However, Giggy doesn't even exist! Yet, the paradox still works when I reason about Giggy. The fact that the paradox works even when I use a fictional being suggests that it doesn't do the work it's usually (naively) supposed to do. This takes us back to my claim that[i] the paradox on its own is inadequate as proof[/i], and therefore, it cannot support the entire argument in which it occurs. My example shows that the Paradox of the Stone doesn't necessarily prove anything about the world, the universe. (The paradox works when applied to my absurd Giggy and cake example.) In sum: Because the paradox does something quite different, it doesn't take the argument's claims far enough and cannot support the burden placed upon it. Argument 1 no longer looks persuasive or credible on its own, and it no longer provides the proper motivation for Argument 2 (which is actually clouded and hindered by the paradox). As it stands, 1 rests on an unexamined metaphysical claim that's as equally contentious as the one it aims to undermine. Lastly, if one still holds on to the idea that the paradox proves the non-existence of an omnipotent being - i.e. it [i]really[/i] proves something - I'll leave with a paradox of my own, based on Zeno's Racetrack Paradox. I choose you, Zeno of Elea! Suppose that you're trying to reach your computer, which is 100 meters away from you, so that you can type out a rebuttal against my claims. However, you will never reach your computer and will therefore not succeed. Here's why. To reach your computer, you'll have to walk half the length, 50 meters. Then, you'll also have to reach half that distance, 25 meters. However, you'll have to reach half of that distance, 12 1/2 meters. And so on. It follows that you'll always have some distance left towards your computer. Therefore, you'll never reach your computer. Q.E.D. [/size]

If I may request more information on the cla[font="Verdana"]im that "[/font]the burning of any book is an offense of a kind, whether that book is Harry Potter or the Qu'ran. I don't think that religious texts should be afforded more respect than any other text, simply because they are religious...[font="Verdana"]"[/font], [font="Verdana"]since I don't want to get things wrong and attribute to anyone claims they do not hold. I want clarification on what, or if, anything is entailed by the notion of denying religious texts a "special" sort of respect that one would not give to a [i]Harry Potter[/i] (even an [i]Archie[/i] comic) book, for example. The claim, as it stands, suggests that all texts should be treated equally, correct? As I noted earlier, I deny that the act of burning a religious text has the same meanings, connotation, and motivations as burning a [i]Harry Potter[/i] book. However, I can't fully motivate this claim unless the quoted item is clarified further. Furthermore, I also request more information on the claim that [/font]"if you were forced to choose between burning a Harry Potter novel or a religious text (specifically the Qu'ran or the Bible) your better off burning a religious text. Might as well save the work of fiction that hasn't directly contributed to the death of so many people." This seems to directly implicate religion in many "crimes against humanity", as it were. Again, if what I wrote isn't equivalent to the quoted passage, and does not express what it intends to express, please correct me if I'm wrong. In this instance, I think that as the quoted claim has been formulated, it leaves room for oversimplifications on such broad and diverse subjects such as wars, politics, and ethnic conflicts, to name a few. Is it meant to say that religions cause - [i]what[/i]? (whatever "cause" means in such a context). These two claims bother me: Is it possible for one to hold both claims at once? I don't assume that either of you do hold both of them, since both of you, James and Heaven's Cloud, obviously put forth different statements. In any event, I do not risk answering my own question based on the status of the quoted claims put forward, since it might misrepresent all sides involved, and that surely is bad for reasonable dialogue.

First thing that came to mind was the fight between Asuka in Unit-02 and the forces of Seele - [i]plus[/i] mass produced Eva units, in [i]The End of Evangelion[/i]. It was bloody, violent - and oddly beautiful and poetic at times. Top it off with J.S. Bach's "Air" floating overhead, and we have the makings for a highly memorable and affecting fight.

If I'm correct, I believe the Westboro Baptist Church in Kansas said that they too would burn copies of the Quran. (It should be noted that they're not even officially affiliated with the Baptist Church, and it consists of a very small congregation.) The Westbro Baptist Church is the same organization that protested at Mr. Rogers' funeral, by the way. The thing about deliberately provocative protests like these is that if there is any semblance of a substantial issue behind the protest, the issue gets lost (remember, provocations are meant to [i]provoke something[/i]). In trying to raise the issue that building a mosque near Ground Zero in NYC might itself be a provocative act, Terry Jones thought that burning holy books on such a solemn day would somehow be the proper way to shed light on the before mentioned issue. It got some discussion going, but not the one he had initially hoped to start. Nevertheless, as far as getting attention, the non-event succeeded in that respect. Also, I don't really agree that this was an issue that shouldn't have even been covered by the media. By bringing it to light and thus exposing it to the general public (worldwide, at that), it undoubtedly put pressure on Terry Jones to reconsider his potential actions, to be responsible for them should he carry them to fruition (suspended, at last glance). With issues like these, sweeping them under the media rug, in all cases, isn't always the right thing to do. As an example, if some person plans on burning a copy of [i]Harry Potter,[/i] that's somewhat different, to say the least, than burning a text considered holy by millions of people. The end results of each action would be different, I think. Holy texts are, after all, metaphysical and ethical systems in which people believe and live (and have for thousands of years). Considering the context (9-11 and the building of the mosque) and situation (the U.S. having troops overseas) in which this issue has taken place, this issue should not be easily and dismissively pushed aside as if it were on par with the burning of [i]Harry Potter[/i] books. By examining it on a wider scale, it makes us question what's covered by the phrase "freedom of speech" (which also leads to examining "freedom of expression", both of which need to be explored in the context of The Constitution of the United States of America, as this [i]specific[/i] issue - viz. the item linked above - originated from the U.S.); it immediately puts pressure on any agent involved in such questionable acts; and it may even open a much needed dialogue as opposed to the outright provocative act. Undoubtedly, the potential outcome is not as neat as I presented it (I don't think it is that tidy, actually; the details are much more complex) and it doesn't always end up with fruitful dialogue between responsible individuals/parties when the media shines its spotlight on something. But what could have been a small festering sore could easily grow into a larger and potentially untreatable growth if left unchecked. In this case, I don't think the media is at fault for covering the story.

When I first become acquainted with a genre or style that's new to me, I just sample everything. As a result, I'm not too choosy at first; I like almost everything I hear (e.g. when I first got into Jrock/pop I liked almost everything I heard, from the most girlish pop to the noisiest guitar freak-outs. So, it wasn't unusual for me to listen to Nami Tamaki and Guitar Wolf right after another). However, once I become very familiar with a style, I start to gain a critical ear, and then select music more carefully. I think that's one reason why my taste in music changes, or become more refined. On to the list! Then: 1. Oasis - [i]Definitly Maybe[/i] 2. Nine Inch Nails - [i]The Downward Spiral[/i] 3. Green Day -[i] Dookie[/i] 4. Offspring - [i]Smash[/i] 5. Prong - [i]Cleansing[/i] 6. Tori Amos - [i]Under The Pink[/i] 7. Faith No More - [i]Angel Dust[/i] 8. Red Hot Chili Peppers - [i]Blood Sugar Sex Magic[/i] 9. Ice Cube - [i]The Predator[/i] 10. Cypress Hill - [i]Black Sunday[/i] Now: 1. Oasis - [i]Definitely Maybe[/i] 2. Nine Inch Nails - [i]The Downward Spiral[/i] 3. Faith No More - [i]Angel Dust[/i] 4. Entombed - [i]Wolverine Blues[/i] 5. Bjork - [i]Homogenic[/i] 6. Crane - [i]Forever[/i] 7. Godflesh - [i]Pure[/i] 8. Manic Street Preachers - [i]This Is My Truth Tell Me Yours[/i] 9. The Chemical Brothers - [i]Dig Your Own Hole[/i] 10. Aphex Twin - [i]...I Care Because You Do[/i] Nowadays I don't even like Green Day or The Offspring (the former has been replaced by older punk, and the latter got a bit too gimicky). RHCP also took a step down, but I still like their older stuff. When [i]Homogenic [/i]was released, I barely listened to Bjork, but now I like her quite a bit. Oasis, NIN, and FNM still stand the test of time, however.

I just watched Movie 8, [i]Broly The Legendary Super Saiyan,[/i] and it too remains faithful to the usual DBZ bag of tricks, haha. Good Lord, just when it looks like all hope is lost - [i]everyone can believe in Goku![/i] So, yeah, I can see why it gets a tad frustrating to watch, movie after movie. Also suspect in almost all of the DBZ films I've watched so far is when [spoiler]Piccolo keeps suddenly popping up like whack-a-mole to suddenly save Gohan from certain death.[/spoiler] Again, that spoiler is about as necessary as lighting a candle for more light in the middle of a sunny afternoon, but what the hey. In any event, I just know I'll watch the rest of the movies I've never watched. On another note, [i]Burst Angel [/i]is not bad, but I've only watched the first episode. However, pushover boy (I don't even know his name) didn't impress me. I sure hope he grows a spine in the course of this series, or it'll be a long watch.

I'll admit that I'm still a fan of DBZ, and as such I decided to watch [i]Dragonball Z: Super Android 13.[/i] I've not seen it until now, so I decided that I'll give it a try. Of course, it doesn't stray at all from the usual trappings of DBZ - e.g. comic interludes, boastful dialogues, power-ups, etc. - but I don't expect it to. It's watchable; it's the sort of anime you put on when you want sustained thought to take a backseat, to put the mind on autopilot, as it were. One thing that bothers me about the DBZ movies is that they nicely wrap up a story in roughly 50 minutes, no matter how insanely powerful the villain is. In this one, the ultimate android is almost unstoppable, yet it gets defeated in the end (no spoiler tags required there, to no one's surprise!). In the anime it usually takes a dozen or more episodes for the heroes to defeat the villain(s). Still, I won't complain too much, since DBZ isn't exactly meant to be the anime version of [i]War and Peace[/i]. I wanted ridiculous action and I got it! Much obliged, DBZ! I also finished [i]Gunslinger Girl[/i], and I'm fairly happy with it. It's like watching some French film full of espionage, intrigue, and sorrow as played out in anime form. It could have easily been a formulaic anime about dangerous little girls with guns, but it had enough substance to bring the premise to life, I think. It's one thing to show a kid holding a gun, but it's another thing to show her proficiently assembling a gun, even when she's not tall enough that her feet touch the ground when sitting in a chair. That shot brings to mind a child sitting in a swing-set, letting her feet dangle care-freely. Little dissonant things like that made the series for me.

My day starts with coffee. I tend to drink it with as little sugar as possible - just enough to take away the edge, and mellow it out a tad. So, roughly 1/3 of a teaspoon. Of course, it needs milk or cream. Two creams is the best, I think. Also, I don't really like any of those flavored coffee creamers anymore. I used to like them years ago, but now I really don't want my coffee to taste like a chocolate bar - I want coffee, not minty almond something or other! If I have no choice, I'll use those powdered whiteners, but, again, I dislike those knock-off brands that leave an odd silt or film at the bottom of the finished cup. I started drinking coffee when I was quite young, haha. Imagine an eight-year old waking up and enjoying a breakfast of Fruit Loops and coffee, while watching Saturday morning cartoons. Ah, that's the life. One day I might stop drinking coffee, but that day hasn't come yet. If I do, I still have tea to fall back on (the only things I drink nowadays are water, coffee, tea, or milk; and in summer only, iced tea). One more thing: I only have one or two cups when I wake up, and that's it for the day. Years ago, it wasn't unusual for me to polish off a pot of coffee by myself (even before going to bed, of all times), but those days are far behind me! Too much coffee makes me feel sick, now. The only times I drink more than two cups per-day are when I'm at a restaurant. Also, cheers for Tim Horton's coffee.

I was thinking of re-watching some episodes from [i]Black Lagoon,[/i] or maybe some choosing some of my favorite story-lines from it (the one with Roberta, or the Hansel and Gretel story-line from "The Second Barrage"). It reminds me that I really need to watch the OVA, since I still haven't seen it! I'll get around to watching it someday, but my list is keeping me occupied for the moment. I think I've got [i]Burst Angel [/i]lined-up next, so once I finish [i]Gunslinger Girl[/i] I'll start [i]Burst Angel[/i]. I've been meaning to watch that one for quite some time now.

I think the next book of Murakami's on my to-read list will be [i]The Wind-up Bird Chronicle.[/i] However, I've always had an interest in reading[i] Kafka by the Shore[/i], since this was the first of his books that I've heard about. When I get around to it, I'll probably read his autobiography, as well. I'd like to get even more into his head, to see what might go into his writings.

I'm watching [i]Gunslinger Girl[/i], and it's holding up nicely so far. I've watched up to ep.7, and it's gotten most of the character introductions out of the way, so I'm waiting to see how they'll handle the storyline set out so far. Of course, it's not all explosions and gunfire (thankfully); it's a series that's not afraid to dwell longingly on a certain subject or theme. I also have to mention the [i]absolutely fantastic[/i] song it uses for the OP: "The Light Before We Land" by The Delgados. Your heart will ache after the OP. I have no idea why I'm re-watching [i]Death Note[/i], but I am - [i]sigh[/i]. It may be a complete mess, especially towards the end, but it's one [i]entertaining[/i] mess! As a fellow who enjoys good reasoning, this series makes me want to pull out my hair and punch a hole through the wall ([spoiler]You gotta be kidding me?! If things couldn't be even more implausible, you go and [i]launch an effin' missile!!![/i][/spoiler]). Haha, but it's a ride that worth taking once more, I think.

Whenever I read the newspaper, I usually read those things just to give my reading experience a sense of completeness (I even read some of the business section, as well). I see them more as [i]suggesting[/i] how you should carry on your day, or perhaps hoping to influence how things will be. As far as horoscopes being prophetic, they're not very, if at all, credible. However, even though I read them mainly out of habit, they entertain me far more than the actual entertainment section in any given newspaper. I'd much rather read a horoscope than read about the latest celebrity arrest - again.

Several months after saying I was going to read [i]Sputnik Sweetheart[/i] by Haruki Murakami, I'm now finally reading it. I'm around half way finished (I read one chapter per-day), and I suspect I'll pick up more of his works after I've finished this one. One thing though: his writing isn't as esoteric and otherworldly as one would suspect from reading the usual raves and reviews. It's fully of this earth, which may be why his writings are seen to have a cryptic air about them. As with this book, it's full of delicate images that come and go, showing that the things of this earth are always threatened to be unfastened - nothing is ever fully secure. And with that, I think, comes that longing for something lasting, eternal, immaterial. I can't say much more, however, since it's still unfolding. Maybe he'll throw a curve-ball my way and demolish my ideas, but I suspect he won't completley cast them aside.