Omnipotence and Omnipotent Beings

[Jax Rhapsody]

I think I'll link a blog for my response later.

[Lunar]

Hmmm............
So I need a little more time to think about number one so I'll just answer the second question. :animedepr



[COLOR="Purple"]
Well yes He can. Sure He has the ability to do whatever He wants when He wants but He's pure. He detests anything not of Him so it does make sense that he would use his power for good. Now if humans could have this power......the world would be like scary. :animedepr Now then you ask why doesn't God do anything about the suffering in the world? Well I think that we have the power to end suffering in the world it's just that all of us aren't making a strong enough effort. We are not spending every moment of each day trying to change things. God could make us help others but he gave us free will. So we can do basically whatever the heck we want. Do we want to end suffering in the world? Besides, God did not cause the suffering, we kind of brought it on ourselves. [/COLOR]

Uhm, did I totally get off topic here? :animeswea

[Jax Rhapsody]

I couldt find the blog entree.
The way I see it is the reliance and belief of such a being was given as a last hope and a way to not take blame for their own actions. FWIW why believe in god and then dissmiss the greeks and romans gods as only mythology, all these religious gods came from the same place a persons mind.

[The Spectacular Professor]

[quote name='Jax Rhapsody']I couldt find the blog entree.
The way I see it is the reliance and belief of such a being was given as a last hope and [B]a way to not take blame for their own actions.[/B] FWIW why believe in god and then dissmiss the greeks and romans gods as only mythology, all these religious gods came from the same place a persons mind.[/QUOTE]

[FONT="Comic Sans MS"]PFFFT.

The concept of sin exists because the concept of God exists. If anything, God is what makes you take responsibility for your actions. I could make just as strong a point about Athiests not having to answer for themselves because they're not looking forward to any eternal consequences.[/FONT]

[Nomurah!]

[SIZE="1"][COLOR="HotPink"]Neither of these are up to me to answer. I am not God. I don't have a religion, whether it be Buddhist, Christian, etc. etc. etc... No one can really answer these questions. For all we know, there is a God. For all the Christians know, there is not. For all we know, God's plan is to make us suffer, but in the end still worship him. Those that don't worship him, go to hell. Not because we are evil, or bad people, no.. Just because of our beliefs. For all we know, however, perhaps God can not yet save us from our suffering, and he intends for the good to go to Heaven. The Bible however speaks differently, and I'm very familiar with the Bible (considering I have read it all the way through, and then some). But from a human standpoint it's impossible to answer.

There was no real point in this post, considering, I just said what most people would say anyway, I suppose. [/COLOR][/SIZE]

[Jax Rhapsody]

[quote name='Ace'][FONT="Comic Sans MS"]PFFFT.

The concept of sin exists because the concept of God exists. If anything, God is what makes you take responsibility for your actions. I could make just as strong a point about Athiests not having to answer for themselves because they're not looking forward to any eternal consequences.[/FONT][/QUOTE]

I'm not necceserially an atiest but I still dont see how such a creature could exist in this diminsional plane or this planet or what have you.

[Boo]

[quote name='Jax Rhapsody']I'm not necceserially an atiest but I still dont see how such a creature could exist in this diminsional plane or this planet or what have you.[/QUOTE][size=1]And iiin the red reeeeed corner, weighing approximately 15% of the world population, but still growing, the Mighty Not-So-Believers! Over in the bluuueee corner, weighing about all the rest of the world, we have the Incredible Believers! This promises to be the match of the day, the week, the year, heck maybe the century! Ho, ho, ho! Let's get ready to argue!




Actually that's me saying: lol.[/size]

[Pleiades Rising]

[size="2"]Ah, yes, the paradox of the stone. This is quite the head-spinner, and has captured the attention of many minds to solve it. However, I state that I will make no attempt to solve or answer the paradox itself for reasons forthcoming, all of which I hope to be satisfactory. As such, I'll concentrate mainly on Argument 1, "God's Omnipotence." I deny that the paradox does what it's assumed to do, thus fails as a proof. It follows that the compound argument itself cannot do what it's supposed to do. It's improperly set-up.

If I understand the question correctly, it asks if an omnipotent being is possible, given some definition of "omnipotence" (in this case, taken to mean something like: "can do anything; is almighty; has unlimited power"). And, given this definition, it then presents the paradox as proof that such an omnipotent being cannot exist. (Notice that the paradox is more of a [i]dilemma[/i], but I'll continue to use the term paradox.) If one continues to accept an omnipotent being, then Argument 1 moves on to Argument 2: either God is omnipotent (perhaps, in a now qualified sense), or God cannot be (entirely?) good. It's clear from quotes, such as "If he could [create a task he cannot do] then it proves that he is not omnipotent, if he cannot then that too proves he is not omnipotent" and "both possible solutions to the answer suggest a God that is not omnipotent" and "they are questions i've always had and have always attributed to my disbelief in God", that the paradox is taken to prove the impossibility of an unqualified omnipotent being existing. The last quote also suggests that Arguments 1 and 2 together provide reasons for believing that God does not exist (or, is unknowable if we agree with the opening sentence about agnosticism). In short, 1 and 2 are presented in the context of a religious argument, for which the paradox is taken to do its work. Now, the paradox is the hinge on which the entire argument turns; without which, 1 is undermined and 2 does not necessarily follow. I propose that the paradox in question is misunderstood and therefore cannot fully do the work it's supposed to do in the compound argument consisting of 1 and 2.

In the argument presented so far, the paradox is seen as some sort of metaphysical tool of refutation, which somehow connects the logical form of the paradox to metaphysics through unquestioned means. It's assumed that the Paradox of the Stone (or, Omnipotence Paradox), as it's commonly presented, has the means to disprove that something is the case in the world - [i]it can prove a fact about the real world[/i]. Basically, it's often casually thrown into arguments as providing proof of the impossibility of an omnipotent being existing in the universe as we know it. However, this asks too much of the paradox on its own, for the paradox raises certain technical issues such as whether the given concept or argument in which it occurs is incoherent, confused, or inconsistent when presented in certain ways or formulations. It raises issues about our reasoning and its correctness; It gives us insight into our ability to reason logically and soundly.

Notice that this can rightfully be studied as a[i] conceptual[/i] investigation, and not entirely as religious investigation. On this approach, I reject the implicit claim that I or anyone else must accept this argument [i]strictly as a religious argument[/i] in order to reply to it. The arguments presuppose that if I attempt to resolve or question the paradox, I'm committing myself to the belief that the paradox is purely a religious problem, and It assumes that I'm committed to the existence of an omnipotent being if I consider the questions posed. Argument 1, in which the paradox is supposed to do all the work, is understood as being a religious problem requiring religious answers. I contend that, as it stands, this is wrong. The paradox can be examined by logical means, both formal and semi-formal. In order to analyze the paradox, I can appeal to methods requiring no religious commitments at all, and still give a reasonable and cogent reply. First, a note on paradoxes of the sort appealed to in Argument 1.

Certain paradoxes are unusual beasts. Notice that they can take the form of a logical argument: they can have premises which can be reasoned with, and they can have conclusions which seemingly follow from the premises. However, what distinguishes these kinds of paradoxes from common arguments is that their conclusions arrive at counterintuitive results. Somewhere along the lines of reasoning, something seems to go wrong with the arguments. Perhaps a premise is false, or the argument's structure is flawed in certain ways, leading to these strange conclusions. Upon closer inspection, paradoxical arguments may reveal that we really don't know the workings of certain concepts, e.g. "infinity", as certain paradoxes of Zeno's point out. The Ship of Thesus points to problems concerning our conception of identity, and perhaps also to our use of referential language. In Set Theory, Russell's Paradox presents problems when one attempts to use a concept in an unqualified way. When paradoxes present themselves, we can be fairly sure that we're in paradox city where the grass is green if and only if the grass isn't green. However, notice that what a paradoxical argument describes need not exist: there's no need to stage a race between a tortoise and a swift runner; there's no need to construct two ships, then ask which one is which; and there's no need to have anything physical beyond pen-and-paper to examine set-theoretical paradoxes. To study some paradoxes, all we need are writing materials and rigorous thought. Simply, it can be an entirely armchair analysis, studied [i]a priori[/i]. Indeed, the tools for studying paradoxes can be conceptual, and logical. It's not unusual to see paradoxes resolved by rigorous analyses involving various formal logics. (When building a brand new ship, the Predicate Calculus isn't nearly as helpful as a hammer.) Because paradoxical arguments share so much in common with logical arguments, formal and semi-formal means can be brought to bear upon their resolution.

The Paradox of the Stone is no exception. It's been studied by thinkers such as Alvin Plantinga and George Mavrodes. Together, Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa published their paper "Anything You Can Do God Can Do Better" on the paradox. Plantinga's and Mavrodes' respective studies conclude that the paradoxical argument is inconsistent, while Brown and Nagasawa hold that the paradox begs the question and equivocates on key terms. These are studies which seem more like conceptual analyses involving formal proofs, instead of religious debates. They each accept definitions on God's omnipotence and certain doctrines (e.g. omnipotence being consistent with the inability to perform[i] impossible tasks[/i], which is what Kisaoda's reply, #25, hints at), and then transform them into symbolic representations which are then manipulated according to formal inference rules (which is what Raiha's reply, #21, also suggests). Key terms are also analysed to see if they retain the same meanings throughout the argument. In such analyses, it's typical to see a symbolic representation like "gAg [/size]�[size="2"] ~(gAg)" occurring within it. The paradox's form is often represented in symbolic forms like this, which is then treated in a proof - a proof of a different sort than how the word is used in this thread's topic. Basically, the paradox is treated logically, and it's not taken to prove anything substantial on its own. Much more needs to be done if anyone's to support a contentious metaphysical claim about God's attributes or existence. Plantinga, a theist, does not rest content with analysing the paradox, and does much work to motivate his theistic arguments. The paradox is merely a first step, which bears more resemblance to a conceptual problem than to a theological problem. To get from the paradox to God requires something else, and neither 1 nor 2 provide that something else. As I pointed out, we can study the paradox alone on formal terms, without supposing that we're engaging in a religious debate. If it's a religious debate, more is needed to motivate the argument than simply appealing to the paradox. The "proof" of the paradox is of a different sort, which doesn't work as the atheist or agnostic, or theist for that matter, thinks it does.

The use of the word "proof" in this argument (viz. "Omnipotence and Omnipotent Beings") seems to refer to a type of method used in scientific contexts. The paradox is thought of as being this kind of empirical proof, showing the some being lacks an attribute. (Perhaps, in a similar way that a pig lacks the ability to fly.) These quotes supports this claim: "If he could [create a stone heavier than he can lift] then it proves that he is not omnipotent, if he cannot then that too proves he is not omnipotent. That's the point of the question" and "If he is omnipotent, then surely he can stop all human suffering. If you liked the first answer i gave to the first question, then why does God not want to help us and end our suffering?" The latter quote questions God's intervention in the known world. As such, the kind of proof appealed to here requires things outside itself to verify its claims. For example, to prove that [i]X[/i] has a half-life of [i]t[/i], you take measurements based on empirical means, including observations of equipment. Along these lines, we form a hypothesis and test the claims deduced from it against the relevant evidence, in accordance to an appropriate theory. In these cases, "proof" requires an appeal to experience - the map requires a corresponding territory, as it were. However, the paradox isn't this sort of proof at all. It fails on this account. To make it work as a scientific proof, it seems that we would need a deity and a rock, and scientists to make observations and measurements. But this seems beyond our range of proof. The "proof" in the argument set forth is actually closer to a mathematical or logical demonstration. The paradox questions [i]logical[/i] possibility, and not necessarily [i]physical[/i] possibility. What's the answer to "[i]x[/i] +[i] y[/i] = 5"? Is "(P & Q) & ~ (P & Q)" consistent? Do some set of numbers have a certain property? Let's construct a proof and find out. This proof involves formal rules and axioms couched in some formal theory, which produce theorems. It's sufficient that we can do this proof on paper alone, without having to count or examine sets of apples. The paradox, if it's a proof at all, is better understood as a being closer to a formal proof, a mathematical demonstration. It makes more sense if understood this way, especially in light on my earlier comments on various logical paradoxes and their resolutions. It now appears questionable that an attribute of God - which is seemingly taken to exist alongside things like electrical charges and mass - could be[i] tested and proved[/i] by a logical paradox.

We should also notice that the argument doesn't really ask: resolve the paradox. Instead, it seems to assert: The paradox proves an omnipotent being does not exist. These quotes support the latter reading.

"...both possible solutions to the answer suggest a God that is not omnipotent."

"I ask these questions because they are questions i've always had and have always attributed to my disbelief in God."

"Until i hear a better explanation, one that actually makes sense, i'm going to say that God can only either be good or omnipotent. God must pick one."

"I seriously doubt that there is an answer to this question that actually satisfies the question and leaves God as an omnipotent being in the literal sense. But you're all welcome to keep trying."

It's clear that the paradox is not only being used as some sort of empirical, scientific proof, but also as a tool of [i]refutation[/i]. As a tool of refutation, it's dropped into the argument as an insurmountable obstacle. It assumes that if anyone accepts that this is a religious argument and that an omnipotent being exists, then those claims lead to self-refuting conclusions. From which, we ought to give up our beliefs in such a being. This double-maneuver obscures the fact that the argument is attempting to be a scientific[i] inquiry[/i] (asking for further data and facts, to arrive at a conclusion) couched in terms of a [i]persuasion dialogue [/i](advancing a specific claim as already proved true, which we ought to accept). So, here we have an assertion put forward requiring more information to verify it (the inquiry part, using the first empirical sense of "proof"), and yet it's also put forward as being true and proved (the persuasion part, still relying on a misunderstood sense of "proof"). The thread is supposedly put forward as opening and allowing further inquiry and knowledge, but it can't because it's already proved something - but we're all welcome to keep trying! I'll leave it up to anyone who agrees with The13thMan's argument to sort out that jumble.

Returning to the paradox - the heart of Argument 1 - the paradoxical argument becomes even more strange when we consider its form and claim. The paradox has the general form as follows:

If God is omnipotent, can God create a task he cannot do?

1. Either God can create a task he cannot do, or God cannot create a task he cannot do.
2. If God can create a task he cannot do, then God is not omnipotent.
3. If God cannot create a task he cannot do, then God is not omnipotent.
4. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

Notice that the creation of the stone heavier than its creator can lift is simply an instance of such a task. It's not necessary that it be a stone, for it only has to be a task that its creator cannot do. Here's such an instance: Can God bake a cake that He cannot eat? It seems odd that omnipotence would hinge on such task as baking a cake. The stone seems grand and worthy of questioning omnipotence, and the cake doesn't. However, since they're both omnipotence-undermining tasks, I see no good reason for disallowing my modified task. To point out another odd thing, I can even replace "God" by "Ziggy" and the argument still works. I have just proved that Ziggy isn't omnipotent! But, one can counter, the question is about an omnipotent being, not Ziggy! Very well, then. Here's my own omnipotent being, created on the spot for this argument: Giggy is an omnipotent being. Now we have the following:

If Giggy is omnipotent, can Giggy bake a cake he cannot eat?

We now have a valid instance for both the original stone-task and my modified cake-task. However, Giggy doesn't even exist! Yet, the paradox still works when I reason about Giggy. The fact that the paradox works even when I use a fictional being suggests that it doesn't do the work it's usually (naively) supposed to do. This takes us back to my claim that[i] the paradox on its own is inadequate as proof[/i], and therefore, it cannot support the entire argument in which it occurs. My example shows that the Paradox of the Stone doesn't necessarily prove anything about the world, the universe. (The paradox works when applied to my absurd Giggy and cake example.) In sum: Because the paradox does something quite different, it doesn't take the argument's claims far enough and cannot support the burden placed upon it. Argument 1 no longer looks persuasive or credible on its own, and it no longer provides the proper motivation for Argument 2 (which is actually clouded and hindered by the paradox). As it stands, 1 rests on an unexamined metaphysical claim that's as equally contentious as the one it aims to undermine.

Lastly, if one still holds on to the idea that the paradox proves the non-existence of an omnipotent being - i.e. it [i]really[/i] proves something - I'll leave with a paradox of my own, based on Zeno's Racetrack Paradox. I choose you, Zeno of Elea!

Suppose that you're trying to reach your computer, which is 100 meters away from you, so that you can type out a rebuttal against my claims. However, you will never reach your computer and will therefore not succeed. Here's why.

To reach your computer, you'll have to walk half the length, 50 meters. Then, you'll also have to reach half that distance, 25 meters. However, you'll have to reach half of that distance, 12 1/2 meters. And so on. It follows that you'll always have some distance left towards your computer. Therefore, you'll never reach your computer.

Q.E.D.
[/size]

[Baron Samedi]

[size="1"]Wow, epic necro.

Zeno's Racetrack Paradox, without the luxury of time to expand, doesn't prove anything... you can try to infinitely divide the distance down, but I can still take steps of the same length. It is a Paradox that even a child realises has no practical applicaiton in the context.

With regard to the broader question concerning omnipotence, I was always of the view that an omnipotent being could set a task which was impossible, but that in the event of any attempt to complete the task, whereby the power was directed at erasing the impossibility rather than completing a task, it would not be able to pose a barrier. Essentially, the decision to revoke the limitation is possible.

That, or, an omnipotent being is still bound by certain immutable rules and are only omnipotent as far as can be exercised in this universe.[/size]

[John]

Alright guys, I'm pretty sure my attention span has gotten a lot shorter since I last used to post here. I just skimmed this thread real fast, so listen up 'cause I'm about to drop some raw **** on y'all:

[b]1. Immovable object/unstoppable force[/b]
The question is flawed. For an object to be immovable, it would have to have infinite inertia, meaning it would have to have infinite mass. By the laws of this universe, that can't happen. Same thing with an unstoppable force, which would require infinite energy. So really, it boils down to the question "can God do what can't be done?", which is an illogical question that can't be given a logical answer, whether positive or negative. It's like saying, "If KFC twelve piece bucket, Oregon backlash swimmingly? CHECK AND MATE, SIR."

On the other hand, I guess it's plausible that he could create a universe whose laws would somehow allow for both immovable objects and unstoppable forces, but that hardly makes for exciting debate on either side. NEXT.

[b]2. Can God be both all-powerful and good if there is evil in the world?[/b]
If we're talking about the Abrahamic God and the Biblical definition of "good" (aren't we always? Doesn't this get boring for anyone?), then yes. But let's talk about that definition for a moment, which I'll estimate as stating that something is "good" if it is, ultimately, sooner or later, somehow pleasing to God. The idea that God loves humans--maybe the most important in the Bible--pushes us towards our next conclusion, that loving God is good, and from there that humans having free will is good, and from there that obeying his commands is good, and from there that being generous, loving others, not punching people (generally)... the whole moral system as espoused by the Bible, is good.

The point is this: that moral system is not the definition of "good" that we are arguing about; it is a derivation of that definition that exists expressly for the benefit of human beings. To one degree or another it most certainly reflects the character of God, but [i]it does not apply to God[/i], nor is he restricted by it.

So no, he's not evil for allowing evils to occur within humanity even though he could stop them. [i][Fair warning: I'm about to get all preachy on you, but I'm not trying to "convert" you via emotional appeal or whatever. I'm just making a case for my side of this oh so dapper, gentlemanly debate, and emotional value is deeply connected to the logic of this case. If this just ends up making things messier in the coming posts, then know that that wasn't my intent.][/i] God sees further and deeper than us. He knows the people who, according to the Bible, he "knit together in the womb", he knows the pain of women who were raped, impregnated, and then shunned from their culture for it; he knows the pain of children who were forced to become soldiers and now get headaches if they go too long without seeing blood; he knows about the billions of people who would be murdered, many in his name, during the short lifespan of the world he created; he knows about the billions more who would wriggle out of screaming women's vaginas, live for 60 or 70 years, and then die without ever once having heard about him. He knows and feels all of this. He knew it and felt it before he kickstarted the whole thing off with a few words, and, unless you want to argue that God's memory fades over time, he will always know and feel those things, even into the coming age of "heaven" when apparently all of his followers will be sitting on clouds and playing Kenny G songs on our harps. And yet, having counted the cost, he decided it was all worth it.

So yes, in the end, there is no apparent contradiction between the notion of an all-powerful god and that god embodying the Judeo-Christian notion of "good".

But! Let's go just one step further: God decided that this universe is good, "but is it the best possible universe? Couldn't he have done better than this?" Excellent question, thank you for asking, but I don't have an answer. And neither do you. God knows more than us (read: everything), but even if he doesn't exist, we still don't know enough ourselves to even begin to make a call like this. Maybe every other alternate variation on this universe really would have been worse than this one; maybe the existence of this amount of suffering really [i]is[/i] exactly the amount we need to "build character" or whatever. Or maybe it's not. Maybe God could've created a universe that had both free will for humans and absolutely no suffering, but he chose not to because he has an even bigger plan that literally can't be comprehended by the human brain (not that his current one as mentioned in the Bible really can either, but that's neither here nor there). Logic falls apart at this point; it doesn't work on this level, it wasn't supposed to, and pretending it does is irrational and just leads to really dumb internet arguments.

Oh man where did this wall of text come from. I DON'T WANT TO BE THIS ANYMORE.

EDIT: Just realized that this was indeed just an epic necro. All the same to me though, I guess. Sup Baron. Edited October 10, 2010 by John

[Gavin]

[center][img]http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y34/ThePicStash/Avatars/Thread_Necromancy.jpg[/img][/center]

[Pleiades Rising]

Dead or not, the argument lives on here and there. It's not hard to find this "argument" in many threads and blogs. So much so that I decided to leave my 3 dollars and 16 cents worth here. Why? This argument gets abused by so many people, atheists and theists. Frankly, I'm quite surprised that neither side of the disputants have actually figured out that paradox isn't doing what it's taken to do. If they have figured it out, smelled something fishy going on, I still wonder why the paradox (read: dilemma) continues to be debated as if it's a religious problem. I think the answer I gave is indeed the correct one, and I maintain that it undermines any naive understanding of the paradoxical arguments set forth. Until the argument is seen aright, I suspect that it will continue to lead anyone who thinks it a proper argument astray, into confusion and error that could be avoided.